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Abstract: The paper analyses the interindustry spillover effects of bilateral trade conflicts using the example of the 2018-2019 China-USA bilateral trade war. Empirical results are produced using a new heuristic method based on hypothetical extraction and substitution in an International Input-Output model.  This model tracts a series of direct and indirect sectoral effects and provides an intuitive and computationally tractable way of mapping the potential gains and losses affecting other trade partners. It sheds light on some intricate inter-industry implications that are not obvious when considering traditional trade models. A large share of the negative impacts may be felt by third countries through two separate trade channels. Firstly, because the production of a final product in one country relies on importing intermediate goods from other trade partners, who may be negatively impacted by the trade destruction effects of the trade embargo. Secondly, because trade embargoes lead to trade substitution in order to fill the gaps left by embargoed products, and to trade deflection. Deflection occurs when the trade belligerents redeploy their unsold exports towards third countries, increasing competition for market shares. This situation is an additional threat for the Multilateral Trade Governance as large-scale trade deflection may induce a cascade of Tit-for-Tat protectionist measures, in a situation where the COVID-19 pandemics has fanned the industrial nationalism, trade protectionism and geo-political tensions which were already perceptible since the global crisis of 2008-2009.  
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Withering globalization? The Global Value Chain effects of trade decoupling 1. Introduction The new production and trade business model that arose in the late 1980’s, based on the geographical fragmentation of the value chain, has increased the economic interdependency of most developed and emerging countries. The several transformational steps that a product undertakes between its initial entry in the production process, usually as an unprocessed primary good and the final consumer are called Global Value Chains (GVCs). “Global”, because most industrial production today use imported inputs and produce for both domestic and export markets, “Value” because at each step, value-added is created by the industry transforming inputs into output, and “Chain” because these industries are usually organised in a network. In this GVC trade network, the output of one firm in a country is used by another firm in another country to produce a more complex product which, in turn, may be used by another firm for further processing (IDE-JETRO et al. 2019) before being exported or locally consumed as a final product. If the normal functioning of a bilateral link within a specific value chain is broken, it will affect all the trade partners in this global interindustry chain. The rupture may be caused by natural events that prevent the production and delivery of parts and components; this was the case in 2011 with the earthquake and tsunami in Japan or the shutdown in 2019 of factories in countries affected by the COVID-19 pandemics. Leaving a deep trade agreement may also result in extensive losses from disrupting global value chains, as many observers feared it would be the outcome of a hard Brexit. Global value chains may also be damaged due to bilateral trade conflicts similar to what happened in 2018-2019 between China and the USA. As Fajgelbaum, Goldberg, Kennedy and Khandelwal (2020) mention, trade restrictions and retaliatory tariffs caused large declines in bilateral imports and exports.  Yet the issue goes well beyond trade conflict and has acquired a geo-political nature which is much more worrisome. As early as 2010, when China–US relations appeared generally positive and benign, Yan Xuetong dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University already asserted that the China–US relationship constituted a ‘superficial friendship’ (Wei, 2019). Governments realised that industrial interdependency could be used to promote strategic interests as long as they could control a key intermediate input. In 2010, the threat of supply chain disruption was used in a dispute on maritime territory, when China banned rare earths exports to Japan during a diplomatic standoff between the two countries after the Senkaku boat collision incident. At that time, this threat was not officially recognised as a retaliation by the Chinese authorities: business as usual under WTO rules remained the best international option. But maintaining the status quo ante was mainly wishful thinking, because the global crisis of 2008-2009 had already changed the way the public opinion and many governments considered globalization and its cost/benefit balance. The status quo ante was officially altered in 2018 with the bilateral trade conflict that arose between China and the USA. While both natural and political causes can both disrupt bilateral value chains, their economic impacts on other trade partners are very different. Natural causes affect the supply side by causing production shortages in a key supplier.  If the affected input is in short supply, the 
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resulting drop in GVC trade spreads to many countries, until the situation is normalised or substitutes are found. The effects are more complex when a bilateral trade war affects two major trade partners. Trade spill-overs take the form of lower trade flows between the two belligerents, as before. Additionally, they occasion also a surge of exports towards third countries. This redirection of exports (often referred to as “trade deflection” in the literature) results from exporting firms in the two belligerent countries trying to redirect their production to other markets. This often causes a rise in protectionism in these recipient countries, in order to limit the sudden surge of imports, which may be aggressively priced and even sold under production cost in order to clear unwanted stocks of output.  The objective of the present paper is to explore and measure these trade and production spill-overs, taking as example the inter-industry linkages existing between China, the USA and their main trade partners.  The analysis is done in three steps, first looking at trade destruction, then at trade substitution, and finally at export deflection, which is a special case of trade diversion in the face of trade barriers.  After reviewing the relevant literature, the paper proposes a new methodology to evaluate the potential trade creation or trade destruction effects on third countries of bilateral trade restrictions. The measurement looks in detail at hypothetical sectoral impacts of policy-induced changes in market shares of final and intermediate products. The simulation focuses on sectors that were particularly targeted by China or the USA during the 2018-2019 bilateral trade conflict. In a last part, the paper illustrates another application of the methodology. By extending the simulation to a large number of sectors, the simulations generate a large body of sectoral data that reveal the mode of international insertion and the vulnerability of countries to trade shocks. A final section highlights the implications for the multilateral trade system and its governance in the Post-COVID19 new normal. Conclusions synthetize the main results.  2. Review of the literature One strand of the trade policy literature that is closely related to our subject is the issue of trade deflection, a special case of trade diversion in the face of trade barriers. This redeployment of exports to third countries in the face of trade conflict was first analysed quantitatively by Bown and Crowley (2003) in the context of the United States' use of import restrictions on Japanese exports between 1992 and 2001.  Using econometric dynamic modelling, they found that the median antidumping duty against Japan led to a 5-7% average increase in Japanese exports to non-US trading partners. Not only exports were diverted to third countries, but some additional trade destruction took place and Japan imported less from its trade partners.   Evenett and Fritz (2018) look more directly into the recent China-USA trade conflict. They emphasise the fact that the previous situation between China and the USA was far from being a free-trade arrangement. The 2018 tariff hikes compound an already significant stock of Chinese and American trade distortions affecting each other’s goods exporters. Besides looking at the trade development, the authors highlights the risks of “multilateralising” the bilateral conflict because of deflection.  Gunnella and Quaglietti (2019) provide a thorough factual analysis of the China-USA issue. Then, they discuss the short and long-term trade and macroeconomic implications of rising protectionism and evaluates its effects on the global economy and the euro area. Mattoo and Staiger (2019) look at the same issue from a game theory angle, considering the conflict as an episode of the U.S. Hegemony vs. China Hegemony phases, with trade conflict being a transition during which 
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a power-based regime might look attractive to a dominant country. Then, this phase if followed by a relatively symmetric situation during which the (multilateral WTO) rules-based system is again the equilibrium regime. Their paper shows that the main systemic costs will arise from the damage done by those tactics to the rules-based multilateral trading system. In a paper related to the theoretical modelling of the impacts of trade conflicts on the WTO multilateral system when GVC trade is prevalent, Beshkar and Lashkaripour (2020) concludes that the gains from non-cooperative trade taxation and the externality inflicted by these taxes on the rest of the world have doubled in the presence of GVCs. Choi (2020) argue that the China-USA relationship is not a temporary shock, but shapes a “New Normal” that will last for some time.  Following an input-output approach similar to ours, Hu, Tian, Wu and Yang (2021) analyse the consequences of the China-US trade conflict using two scenarios: complete decoupling and partial decoupling. In the first case, China suffers a 3.65% drop in its GDP, compared to 1.04% for the USA. The decoupling of US-China trade brings collateral damage to other economies besides the US and China. For example, Chinese Taipei’s and South Korea’s GDP are expected to drop by 1.50% and 0.72%, respectively, under this scenario.  The authors do not foresee a complete decoupling as the most probable option, and their preferred scenario is a partial decoupling centred on technology-intensive industries. Using input-output tables disaggregating domestic and multinational firms, they conclude that such a scenario would affect much more the multi-national entities, especially those located in China (their gross value-added would drop -6.53%, compared to -1.90% for domestic firms). The authors conclude that one of China’s alternatives is to increase its trade links with Asian and European economies. Our analysis shares the same input-output philosophy than Hu et al. (2021) but differs on the computation of the trade effects. In particular, we go beyond trade destruction to look also at the substitution and deflection effects affecting third countries. Given the large value of bilateral exports targeted by the belligerents, the extent of trade diversion to other countries is potentially large enough to create additional trade tensions and see these countries responding by raising trade barriers. This would be followed by Tit-for-Tat retaliations and cause further damage to the multilateral trade governance. When looking at the data for 2018, Evenett and Fritz (2018) conclude that, so far, “the fears of massive trade deflection induced by the Sino-US tariff war have yet to materialise”.  One of the reasons trade deflection may not be as strong as expected is that global value chains allow firms in targeted countries to move final production to other places. Ma and Van Assche (2014) develop a theoretical model in which this ability to spatially separate manufacturing from headquarter provides the flexibility to circumvent economy-specific tariff changes by switching production location abroad. Tariff shirking increases the elasticity of bilateral trade to economy-specific tariff hikes due to an extra extensive margin effect. Using firm-level and province-level export data from China, they find evidence that the Chinese exports that are part of global value chains are more sensitive to antidumping measures than Chinese exports that rely on domestic value chains.  Tariff shirking actually reduces the effectiveness of economy-specific trade policy barriers when trade is done through global value chains (GVC). This new business model which emerged at the end of the 1980s and the importance of trade in intermediate inputs has modified our understanding of comparative advantages and their measurement (Escaith, 2020). The internationalisation of manufacture production and the growing interdependence and integration 
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of national economies has placed the specialisation of countries within GVCs at the centre stage of industrialisation strategies (Antras and Gortari, 2019). 3. Methodology The measurement of trade along GVCs is closely associated with Input-Output tables. It builds also on the Leontief model to measure the direct and indirect contribution of all the production nodes that are required for the production of an exported product. It is a relatively new discipline, even if the idea itself is much anterior. Balassa (1967) defined Vertical Specialization as the production process of a commodity when it is divided into a vertical trade chain, each country adding value at each stage of the production process. Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) extended Balassa’s concept and proposed a measurement method based on national input-output tables. Daudin, Rifflart and Schweisguth (2009) apply this new line of trade analysis to international input-output models, using the “Leontief decomposition”.  This “Leontief decomposition” approach has been further refined, leading to the definition of new GVC indicators.  Among them, Koopman, Powers, Wang and Wei (2011) decompose GVC trade into several trades in value-added indicators. Pursuing this line of work, Wang, Wei and Zhu (2013) extend the information contained in inter-country input-output tables to decompose GVC trade and derive additional indicators.  A paper by Los and Timmer (2018) shows that these new “Trade in VA” measures can be linked to a broader family of Input-Output analysis called “hypothetical extraction”. Hypothetical extraction is one of the techniques traditionally used to identify key sectors and has been applied to a wide range of topics. Miller and Lahr (2001) provide a review of the different lines of analysis based on this method; Dietzenbacher and Lahr (2013) generalize the approach. Our contribution builds on the hypothetical extraction method and add substitution and trade deflection effects. The present methodology is specifically designed to measure the spillovers effects on third countries resulting from a bilateral trade conflict between two large trading partners that trade in both intermediate and final goods. The definition of spillovers in this case are the direct and indirect effects, positive or negative, that may occur to the other trade partners because some bilateral supply chains are disrupted while market access for final goods is blocked. The ‘supply-chain contagion’ is a negative effect: a supply shock in one nation, or in one industry within a nation, become a supply shock in other industries and in other countries when the product that is no more delivered is an input into the production of something else.  By reducing production in one country, the supply chain contagion reduces also demand for intermediate inputs sourced for other countries. This is a “trade destruction effect”. On the other hand, when trade conflict rises market access for goods from a specific country, it opens new export opportunities for other trade partners, a “trade creation” effect. Finally, the exporting country that faces new market access barriers in one of its major market will try to redeploy the lost export to other countries, creating a “trade deflection” effect. 
1) Methodological building blocks Our mapping of these three spillover effects combines two branches of input-output analysis: Hypothetical Extraction and Trade in Value-Added. In both cases, the starting point is an international input output table providing information on the value of demand for domestic and imported final an intermediary goods and services by country and industry as well as the origin 
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and destination of the related trade flows (see Figure 1). 




Intermediate Use Final Demand 
Total 




1 𝑍11 𝑍12 … 𝑍1𝑚  𝑌11 𝑌12 … 𝑌1𝑚  𝑋 1  
2 𝑍21 𝑍22 … 𝑍2𝑚  𝑌21 𝑌22 … 𝑌2𝑚 𝑋2 … … … … … … … … …  
M 𝑍𝑚1 𝑍𝑚2 … 𝑍𝑚𝑚  𝑌𝑚1 𝑌𝑚2 … 𝑌𝑚𝑚  𝑋𝑚  
Value-added (𝑉𝐴1)′ (𝑉𝐴2)′ … (𝑉𝐴𝑚)′      
Total output (𝑋1)′ (𝑋2)′ … (𝑋𝑚)′       Notes: Zsr is an k×k matrix of intermediate input flows that are produced in country s and used in country r, k being the number of activity sectors (goods and services) and n the number of countries; Ysr is an k×1 vector giving final products produced in country s and consumed in country r; Xs is also an k×1 vector giving gross outputs in country 
s; and VAs denotes an k×1 vector of direct value added in country s. Source: Adapted from Wang, Wei and Zhu (2013) 
 In input-output modelling, the final demand side is considered exogenous to the model, while demand for intermediate goods and services are endogenous and determined by a Leontief production function. For each industry, this function is described by reading the international input-output matrix vertically, each element Zsri,j  indicating how much input industry “i” located in country “s” purchased from the sector “j” located in country “r” in order to produce Xsi of output.   The production on one unit of output in a GVC will therefore induce production in a number of other supply chains located in a more upstream situation. The decomposition of the various industrial contribution to the production of a given output starts with the Leontief model: X = A⋅X + Y        (1) where: 
 X: is an n⋅k ⨯1 vector of the output of k industries within an economy of n countries. 
 A: is the technical coefficient n⋅k⨯n⋅k matrix describing the interrelationships between industries; with  aij the ratio of inputs from domestic industry i used in the output of industry j.  
 Y: is an n⋅k⨯1 vector of final demand for domestically produced goods and services, including exports. Direct requirements list the purchases of inputs from other industries that an industrial sector needs to do to produce one unit of output. In a multi-country input-output table, these inputs are identified by the industry supplying them and its country of origin. From a production network perspective, direct requirements indicate the countries and sectors belonging to the domestic and international supply chain contributing to the production of a given output. The direct coefficient coefficients are given by the A matrix (1).   Total requirements measure the full extent of purchases of inputs directly required or indirectly induced to produce one unit of output. It derives from the Leontief inverse (I -A)-1, deducting 1 from the main diagonal of the Leontief (the “1” represents the unit of the product produced for final demand). Total Requirements: (I -A)-1 – I         (2) Where I:   is an n⋅k  by  n⋅k identity matrix The contribution of exports to total economy value-added derives from (1) and is equal to:   v⋅ (I-A)-1⋅e                     (3) 
 where:  v:is a 1⨯n⋅k vector with components mj giving the ratio of value-added to output in industry j; and e: is a n⋅k⨯1 vector of exports by industry. 
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 As explained more in details in Escaith (2019), I extend the hypothetical extraction method (Miller and Lahr, 2001; Dietzenbacher and Lahr, 2013) to measure both trade destruction and trade deflection. The starting point of the method is the same inter-country input-output model we presented in Figure 1. In the traditional hypothetical extraction method, one deletes in the actual input-output matrix the industry that is analysed. A new Leontief model is constructed. The difference between the initial and the modified models indicates the importance of the industry for the entire economy.  In their application to the measure of trade in value-added, Los and Timmer (2018) do not extract entire industries from the system, but only some transactions related to a specific set of industries belonging to a specified country. For example, imagine we want to know the importance of Chinese value chains exporting machinery equipment to the USA. If China is country 1 in Figure 1 and the USA is country 2, Los and Timmer (2018) suggest to set to 0 all the elements in A corresponding to Zm12 as well as the output of industry “m” imported by country “2” for its final demand (Ym12).  A new GDP for country1 is calculated: GDP1*2 = v1*2⋅ (I-A1*2)-1⋅ Y1*2 ⋅ i                                                                                      (4) Where: 
v1* is the n⋅k vector as in (1), with all elements not corresponding to the extracted country set to 0;  A1*2 and Y1*2 are the matrices of technical coefficients and final demand after extraction of exports of product “m” from country “1” to country “2”; i: is the summation unit vector of dimension n⋅m (all elements are equal to 1). The difference between the actual GDP1 value of “1” and GDP1*2 gives the value-added created by “1” and consumed by “2” for industry “m”. VAXD1,2m = GDP1 − GDP1*2       (5) 
2) Adding trade creation and trade deflection In commenting their approach, Los and Timmer (2018) state page 10 “We would like to emphasize that GDPr*s should not be seen as the GDP level that would result if exports to s would be prohibitive. In a general setting with more flexible production and demand functions, substitution effects will 
occur [emphasis is mine].” My methodology follows their excellent advice and complements extraction with substitution.  We extract some transactions (those affected by the trade war), then contemplate for the possibility of replacing the extracted outputs (trade destruction) through trade creation. Full substitution supposes that goods are substitutable and industries can seize the business opportunities created by the withdrawal of a competitor. 1  But substitution may face some 
 
1 This suppose a deviation from the Leontief production function, which does not contemplate substitution because inputs (intermediate and primary) are complementary. Computable general equilibrium models, at the contrary, do contemplate substitution.  
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additional costs. As in Los and Timmer (2018), our initial extraction means we set to 0 all the elements in A corresponding to Zm12 as well as the output of industry “m” produced by 1 and imported by country “2” for its final demand (Ym12) in Figure 1.  In the case of final demand (the same reasoning applies to intermediate products), the bilateral flows of products “m” exported by country “i” to country “j” respect the following gravity equation: 2 Ymij = Xmi. Xm.jXm.. 𝑑ij2                            (6) where 𝑌𝑚𝑖𝑗 are exports of m from i to j,  𝑋𝑚𝑖.   is i's economic size from the supply-side perspective (the mass of products supplied at origin i), 𝑋𝑚.𝑗   is j's market size (the mass of products 
m demanded at destination j). At world level, total supply of m equals total demand and is noted 𝑋𝑚..  ; 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the economic distance between i and j (a measure of the bilateral trade frictions that impede pure free trade in the gravity model).  What happens when a productor s is excluded from a market r? The relative sizes of all other producers for this specific market are artificially increased because s has to withdraw from the competition. From the specific viewpoint of the competition on the r market, it is “as if” 𝑋𝑚𝑠.  had been extracted from the World competition 𝑋𝑚.. . The new gravity equation for this specific market is: Y′mir = Xmi. Xm.rXm′.. 𝑑ij2         (7) For all i ≠ s ; with 𝑋𝑚′.. = (𝑋𝑚.. −  𝑋𝑚𝑠. ) Keeping final demand 𝑋𝑚.𝑟  and  𝑑𝑖𝑗  constant by hypothesis, the ratio between the new sales from country i ≠ s to country r and the previous ones is, after a few substitutions: Y′miYmi = Xm.. /Xm′..         (8) To resume, after extraction and assuming perfect substitution, for the product “m” subjected to trade embargo:  (1) exports of s to r drop to 0 (extraction) (2) domestic sales of r and exports of country i ≠ s to r increases to fill the gap; and  (2) each country i≠s increases its sales in proportion of the ex-ante market shares.  
Box 1: A parenthesis on substitution Substitution in our model implies that products are close substitute (no strong differentiation in varieties) so that consumers and firms can swap suppliers. This may not always be the case, especially for specialised intermediate inputs entering into the production function or patented final goods. The substitution elasticities (estimated using multilateral trade data) for the intermediate inputs industries tend to be higher than those for the final consumption goods industries (Saito, 2004). Moreover, elasticity varies greatly from sector to sector (Caliendo and Parro, 2015).  In business practices, the supply elasticity is usually determined by the time frame allowed for 
 
2 The model is one of the workhorses frequently used by trade analysis. It was initially based on a purely statistical specification following Jan Tinbergen (1903-1994) original formulation.  Gravity received a micro-economic foundation with Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). 
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substitution, by the spare production capacity available to alternative suppliers, their level of stocks and their technical capabilities (including ownership of critical patents).  Substituting between sources for standard commodities is easy, and it remains relatively easy for many “referenced” industrial parts like computer hard disks or electronic components. For these standard products, the rise in prices for the additional supplies produced in addition to the previous requirement is probably not permanent. When the supply chain managers renegotiate their long-term procurement contracts with their suppliers, they will ask for the same price for all the inputs supplied. Thus, after some time, our model expects input prices to return to their initial situation.  It may prove more difficult for specialised parts and components, especially when protected by patents. At the limit, when no substitution exists (for example when the initial supplier has a de facto monopoly, such as producing a specialised engine or landing gear for a given plane), then all the adjustments along the supply chain have to be done in the quantity space, proportionally to the bottleneck.  While recognising the importance of this extreme case, we exclude it from our simulation and consider that all products are ultimately substitutable. This simplifying assumption is probably not too restrictive, at our level of aggregation, according to the results of Bayoumi, Appendino and Ceredeiro (2018) who find that import elasticities to different types of intermediate inputs are statistically indistinguishable from one another.  
 Now, let’s turn to the extracted industry in country “s”. The firms affected by the extraction of some of their markets in country “r” will try to redeploy the lost sales by selling more on the domestic market and exporting to other markets. This redeployment in the face of trade conflict is known as “deflection” in the trade literature. In order to exclude situations of dumping that would affect final prices (income and prices are supposed to remain constant to keep final demand stable through the analysis), we consider that extracted industries will redeploy their output-gap to other markets by marketing more aggressively their products.  Trade deflection displaces other suppliers. In our gravity model (8), they are displaced in proportion of their previous market share. Yet, it may not be possible for the extracted industry in “s” to fully redeploy to third markets the output that was originally destinated for sale in country “r”, because its competitors will defend their market share. So, the final outcome may rest between the two extreme points of extraction with and without substitution. In absence of any additional information on the degree of substitutability of the respective product, we will consider three scenarios. Two are extreme solutions: zero or full substitution. The third is a mixed one where only half of the production-gap can be redeployed to other markets. This simple solution is also, from a statistical perspective, the expected value of the redeployed share when no prior information is available, as long as the probability distribution of the possible outcomes is symmetric. If, in addition, the distribution is unimodal, then the expected value is also the most probable.   These scenarios translate into the following simulation sequence, considering that the trade war between country “A” and “B” is initiated by “A” and affect industrial product “q”:  
- The first stage extracts B’ manufacturing exports to A for intermediate and final goods. This corresponds to traditional extraction without replacement. The consequences are trade destructions. One example of that was the disruption of automobile international supply chain in 2011 after the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami that struck the 
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northeast coast of Japan (see Escaith, Teh, Keck and Nee, 2011). On a much global scale, it is what occurred also in 2020 with the COVID-19 pandemics. The supply chain disruptions caused by the “Great Lockdown” impacted several industries worldwide and created shortages of many critical goods. But, at the difference of our model, Final Demand was also severely affected in many countries by the economic collapse. 
- In a second stage, other countries substitute exports of “B” to “A” for both Intermediate and Final Goods but the additional sale of intermediate goods is done at a higher price (the price of final goods remains the same in order to keep Final Demand constant). The input cost for the industries in country “A” that have to substitute for the inputs originating from “B” is now larger and the rate of value-added is smaller.3  
- With the passing of time, the higher procurement cost disappears and the competitors of “B” supply their intermediate products to “A” at the pre-crisis prices. The rate of value-added of the industries in “A” returns to it pre-crisis situation.  But it is not the end of the story. Country “B” aggressively markets its product to third countries in order to compensate for the market losses in “A”, without changing the price of its intermediate and final products. There is no change in the volume and structure of final demand.  This scenario has two variants: 
- Partial export deflection: only 50% of the losses can be redeployed. This variant corresponds to the expected value, from a statistical perspective. 
- Full export deflection: all sales are redeployed, when feasible. 4  This scenario corresponds to an extreme case of trade deflection, when all unsold exports are redirected to third markets where they displace the products of other trade partners. This scenario is also one setting the stage for major multilateral trade tensions.  
3) Uses and limitations of the “extraction cum substitution” method Our heuristic method is purely exploratory. It aims at revealing inter-industrial trade structures that would not be easily identified using standard input-output or network analysis. Needless to say, this level of interactions would be unobservable using official trade statistics. This approach provides an intuitive and computationally tractable way to explore alternative scenarios. It goes beyond indirect requirements by quantifying the extent of the struggle for market share that could follow such a disruption. This said, this method has limitations and remains exploratory in nature. At the difference of CGE modelling or other macro and multi-sectoral models such as Caliendo and Parro (2015), it does not pretend to “predict” an outcome of a bilateral trade conflict on the World Trade Network of measure its welfare effect. The objective is mainly descriptive, to produce a series of “markers” corresponding to extreme or expected trade patterns that should help mapping what remain largely unchartered waters: the direct and indirect effects of a bilateral trade war between two economic giants. Actually, the simulation is more akin to analysing the shock from a partial 
 
3 We use an arbitrary 30% additional cost on procuring the new inputs. By construction, the price to final consumers does not change: Value Added in the industries “2” needs to be reduced in proportion of the higher procurement cost, in order to keep the price of the output unchanged.  
4 If the extracted industry is dominant on a given market and its competitors have little market share, it may not be possible to fulfil the redeployment target, even after taking 100% of the competitors’ market share. 
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equilibrium approach. 5 In particular, and except for the short-run scenario, the simulation avoids the issue of price elasticity by keeping prices constant.  The hypothesis that income and prices remain constant means that our substitution effects ignore the gains from trade from the consumers’ perspective. Even when looking at the producer side, the surplus (as measured by value-added) is reduced only in the short time. Moreover, the method does not contemplate a situation where the conflict would disrupt an entire supply chain, resulting in the bankruptcy of the firms most dependents of the extracted inputs. As a result, trade disruption in our methodology always results in a net gain for the protectionist country, something that contradicts both theory and practice. For this reason, we recommend to use the method only for what it was developed: mapping the spill-over effects on third countries rather than estimating the impact on the two belligerents. 4. Quantitative Analysis: Application to the China-USA trade conflict  In this section, we map our simulation model to global trade and production data. We use the WIOD input-output database (see Timmer et al., 2015 for an introduction) in its November 2016 edition, with results updated at year 2014.   We focus the analysis on 17 countries belonging to the G20 group or to the Asian region.6  The substitution and redeployment effects will take place in these countries, which represent the largest industrial and developing economies. All other results are aggregated in a new Rest of the World (ROW). 
1) Extent of pre-crisis interindustry linkages The pre-crisis situation is the basis for all further simulations of our partial equilibrium analysis. A first measure of the strength of inter-industry linkages is given by the direct and total requirements. 
a) Direct and Indirect Requirements Direct requirements show the inputs from other industries, at home or abroad, that an industrial sector needs to purchase in order to produce one unit of output. Total requirements measure the full extent of inputs directly required or indirectly induced to produce one unit of output. While direct requirements exported by the targeted industry to the protecting country drop to 0 due to extraction, the corresponding total requirements will remain positive because some of the inputs sourced by the protecting economy from other industries (in the home country or imported) do include value-added originating from the extracted industry. The outcome of the simulations relies heavily on the evolution of total requirements and the distribution of final demand market shares.  We present aggregated results representing four branches of activities that were particularly targeted during the 2018-2019 bilateral trade conflict: Agriculture, Basic Metals, Electronics and Vehicles.  The last two ones are involved in GVCs at both intermediate and final stages of production, while the first ones are more upstream.  
 
5 From an economic perspective, the ex-ante situation was the product of a general equilibrium and the existing market share represented the relative competitive advantages of the various countries on the extracted market. Reassigning the market shares in proportion of the previous equilibrium means simply the relative competitiveness of the non-extracted industries and the impact of trade frictions as specified in a standard gravity model have remained the same, under a ceteris paribus assumption.  




• Agriculture Agriculture was a sector targeted by China in retaliation to US increase in tariffs. We note in Table 1 that the US agricultural sector is relying mainly on domestic inputs (it is even more the case for China). The international spill-overs through the supply chain are therefore expected to remain limited. 
Table 1 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities: Direct and indirect requirements in 2014 
  China   USA 
Countries Direct Total   Direct Total 
AUS 0.001 0.006  0.000 0.002 
BRA 0.002 0.008  0.002 0.006 
CAN 0.000 0.002  0.009 0.037 
CHN 0.382 0.953  0.003 0.029 
DEU 0.000 0.004  0.002 0.010 
FRA 0.000 0.002  0.001 0.005 
GBR 0.000 0.001  0.002 0.008 
IDN 0.001 0.003  0.001 0.002 
IND 0.000 0.002  0.002 0.005 
ITA 0.000 0.001  0.001 0.004 
JPN 0.001 0.007  0.002 0.010 
KOR 0.001 0.009  0.001 0.007 
MEX 0.000 0.000  0.004 0.013 
RUS 0.000 0.003  0.001 0.006 
TUR 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.001 
TWN 0.001 0.006  0.001 0.004 
USA 0.002 0.012  0.535 1.000 
ROW 0.006 0.059   0.027 0.112 
Total 0.40 1.08  0.59 1.26 
  - Domestic 0.38 0.95  0.53 1.00 
       Domestic  (%) 96% 88%   91% 79% Note: The columns indicate where is located the productive industry and the lines show the origin of the intermediate inputs that were required to produce one unit of output. Source: Based on WIOD tables. 
 
• Basic metals Basic metals manufacturing was amongst the first industries targeted by the US administration in 2018.    Table 2 Manufacture of basic metals: Direct and indirect requirements in 2014 
 China  USA 
ISO Direct Total  Direct Total 
AUS 0.009 0.037  0.001 0.006 
BRA 0.002 0.010  0.005 0.016 
CAN 0.001 0.005  0.034 0.085 
CHN 0.754 2.113  0.007 0.061 
DEU 0.001 0.013  0.006 0.025 
FRA 0.000 0.005  0.002 0.010 
GBR 0.001 0.008  0.005 0.017 
IDN 0.001 0.005  0.000 0.003 
IND 0.001 0.005  0.001 0.007 
ITA 0.000 0.004  0.003 0.012 
JPN 0.003 0.022  0.005 0.023 
KOR 0.003 0.022  0.004 0.018 
MEX 0.000 0.002  0.016 0.041 
RUS 0.003 0.022  0.004 0.019 
TUR 0.000 0.002  0.002 0.006 
TWN 0.001 0.013  0.002 0.009 
USA 0.001 0.019  0.644 1.217 
ROW 0.057 0.299   0.040 0.187 
Total 0.839 2.608  0.781 1.76 
  - Domestic 0.754 2.113  0.644 1.22 
    Domestic(%) 90% 81%   82% 69% Note and source: see Table 1 When looking at the direct and total requirements, one notes that the main source of spill-over effects from this trade restriction affecting Chinese industry will be felt by the producers of 
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extractive commodities in the Rest of the World. Australia and Asian trade partners, as well as Europe are expected to suffer from shortfalls in their economic activity.   Note that the indirect effects on the Chinese economy are ten time larger than what direct requirements would suggest. The USA would also be indirectly affected by trade restrictions affecting Chinese products: US industries provide inputs (goods and services) to third countries being more directly exposed to a slow-down in Chinese production of basic metals. Among the foreign suppliers of inputs to the USA, Canada is the trade partner most affected country. Mexico, the other NAFTA trade partner, is not particularly concerned by the negative spill-overs.  
• Computer, electronics and optical equipment  This segment of manufacture relies heavily on GVC arrangements and is part of the bilateral trade flows to be restricted by the USA. Contrary to expectations, China is not particularly dependent on imported inputs for this sector, at least when looking at the industrial average. 84% of the inputs directly required for the production of electronics and optical equipment is sourced locally (Table 3). The picture is even more striking for total requirements, as 74% of the shock affecting this line of production would be felt domestically. The Rest of the World is particularly exposed to a slow-down in this branch of activity in China (much more than what would happen if the shock affected the US electronic industry). Among the individual foreign suppliers to the Chinese electronic industry, Korean economy would be most affected, followed by Chinese Taipei and Japan. The USA arrives in fourth position in the list of the foreign suppliers, if we exclude the Rest of the World aggregate.  
Table 3 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products: Direct and indirect requirements in 2014 
  China   USA 
ISO Direct Total   Direct Total 
AUS 0.000 0.012  0.000 0.002 
BRA 0.000 0.005  0.000 0.003 
CAN 0.000 0.004  0.005 0.014 
CHN 0.691 2.061  0.017 0.080 
DEU 0.002 0.020  0.003 0.010 
FRA 0.001 0.008  0.001 0.004 
GBR 0.000 0.007  0.002 0.006 
IDN 0.000 0.005  0.000 0.001 
IND 0.000 0.005  0.000 0.002 
ITA 0.000 0.005  0.001 0.003 
JPN 0.010 0.063  0.005 0.018 
KOR 0.023 0.102  0.005 0.017 
MEX 0.000 0.002  0.008 0.015 
RUS 0.000 0.011  0.000 0.003 
TUR 0.000 0.002  0.000 0.001 
TWN 0.025 0.081  0.003 0.010 
USA 0.003 0.030  0.225 0.383 
ROW 0.067 0.376   0.025 0.091 
Total 0.823 2.798  0.302 0.664 
  - Domestic 0.691 2.061  0.225 0.383 
        (%) 84% 74%   74% 58% Note and source: see Table 1 
 




Table 4 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers: Direct and indirect requirements in 2014 
  China   USA 
ISO Direct Total   Direct Total 
AUS 0.001 0.014  0.000 0.005 
BRA 0.000 0.005  0.002 0.010 
CAN 0.000 0.003  0.022 0.062 
CHN 0.780 2.439  0.021 0.133 
DEU 0.007 0.032  0.013 0.045 
FRA 0.001 0.007  0.002 0.011 
GBR 0.001 0.006  0.003 0.014 
IDN 0.000 0.004  0.001 0.004 
IND 0.000 0.004  0.002 0.009 
ITA 0.000 0.005  0.003 0.015 
JPN 0.006 0.040  0.017 0.066 
KOR 0.004 0.033  0.009 0.036 
MEX 0.000 0.002  0.033 0.073 
RUS 0.000 0.009  0.001 0.009 
TUR 0.000 0.002  0.001 0.005 
TWN 0.002 0.017  0.005 0.018 
USA 0.002 0.020  0.596 1.161 
ROW 0.011 0.177   0.026 0.162 
Total 0.82 2.82  0.76 1.84 
  - Domestic 0.78 2.44  0.60 1.16 
        (%) 96% 87%   79% 63% Note and source: see Table 1 
 The self-inflicted accumulated impact on its domestic economy is almost twice what is registered by Mexico (0.133 vs. 0.073), despite the fact that the latter is the main foreign direct provider according to Table 4. This surprising result is due to the high domestic value-added content of China’s automobile industry (84% of the total effects are domestic) compared to only 36% in the case of Mexico or the even lower 28% registered for Canada: a shortfall in Chinese production due to lower demand from the US automotive industry will mainly be felt domestically.  
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KOR  Electronics  18,861 15,043 14,146 4,200 8,595 1,351 456 18,112 
 JPN  Electronics  11,031 7,599 6,569 2,039 3,854 677 613 4,997 
 JPN  Electrical   4,658 4,970 1,817 657 995 165 152 3,218 
 DEU  Machinery n.e.s  14,422 4,534 1,507 584 804 119 58 7,199 
 USA  Electronics  4,713 1,598 1,192 352 718 121 314 647 
 DEU  Electrical  3,240 3,488 1,260 458 697 105 55 2,515 
 JPN  Bas. Metal  110 4,647 1,304 552 633 119 102 3,886 
 JPN  Machinery n.e.s  8,538 3,467 1,168 443 625 100 84 2,894 
 AUS  Bas. Metal  16 4,161 1,221 513 592 117 29 2,057 
 KOR  Electrical  2,124 2,626 1,008 356 564 88 30 2,123 
 DEU  Vehicle  13,481 5,498 1,057 460 499 98 44 8,393 
 DEU  Electronics  3,627 959 815 251 488 77 37 1,517 
 JPN  Vehicle  5,810 4,412 845 365 398 82 48 2,928 
 KOR  Machinery n.e.s  4,990 2,115 713 271 383 59 23 3,039 
 USA  Machinery n.e.s  4,984 2,188 623 236 335 51 132 1,562 
 JPN  Metalproducts  824 2,183 592 240 298 53 47 893 
 KOR  Bas. Metal  29 2,082 602 252 298 52 20 1,655 
 GBR  Bas. Metal  5 1,857 543 229 264 50 14 1,300 
 TWN  Bas. Metal  - 1,550 458 193 222 43 6 1,982 
 KOR  Vehicle  1,414 2,126 417 179 198 40 12 1,429 
 ITA  Machinery n.e.s  3,077 1,029 353 135 188 30 5 1,442 
 RUS  Bas. Metal  1 1,248 368 155 178 35 8 126 
 IND  Bas. Metal  12 1,198 350 146 171 33 9 667 
 DEU  Bas. Metal  39 1,109 319 137 155 27 13 904 
 DEU  Metalproducts  404 1,045 284 118 143 23 12 450 
 BRA  Bas. Metal  2 1,002 295 124 143 28 7 215 
 TWN  Machinery n.e.s  3,172 761 261 100 139 22 3 3,122 
 FRA  Electronics  595 229 224 66 135 22 5 317 
 FRA  Machinery n.e.s  1,249 712 243 93 130 20 5 918 Note:  GVC partners ranked on their value-added re-exported by the USA to third countries (DVA_INTrexI2).  DVA_FIN: Domestic value added in final exports; DVA_INT: Domestic value added in intermediate exports absorbed by importers, or (DVA_INTrex) re-exported to third countries. This value is further split into the value-added re-exported to third countries as intermediate inputs to produce final goods (DVA_INTrexI1), re-exported to third countries as final goods (DVA_INTrexF) or re-exported to third countries as intermediate inputs to produce exports (DVA_INTrexI2). Other indicators provide information on the domestic value-added returning home, either as intermediate or final goods (RDV_tot) and the foreign value-added content (FVA_tot). Source: Based on WIOD data, using the R package Decompr (Quast and Kummritz, 2015) 

















RDV_tot FVA_tot  CHN   Electronics  54,249 20,157 4,166 1,683 1,848 634 429 25,765  CAN   Bas. Metal  31 12,949 3,523 1,745 1,276 501 782 4,003  MEX   Vehicle  20,810 10,592 1,986 633 1,066 287 236 20,870  JPN   Vehicle  30,307 7,825 1,667 568 833 265 35 10,905  CHN   Machinery, n.e.s  13,759 9,107 1,914 842 809 263 195 4,375  MEX   Bas. Metal  - 5,305 1,717 783 705 229 196 1,411  CHN   Vehicle  3,636 6,802 1,310 474 619 217 136 1,732  CHN   Electrical  15,963 8,561 1,459 623 624 212 147 5,434  JPN   Electronics  3,912 5,866 1,290 509 582 199 55 2,637  DEU   Vehicle  21,929 5,388 1,089 392 527 170 56 12,026  KOR   Electronics  3,788 4,618 1,038 410 471 158 22 4,522  CHN   Metalproducts  5,009 5,762 1,104 480 468 157 109 2,075  BRA   Bas. Metal  22 2,626 957 431 377 149 22 560  RUS   Bas. Metal  36 2,498 926 420 364 142 10 252  MEX   Machinery, n.e.s  6,336 5,341 1,106 485 482 139 121 5,356  KOR   Vehicle  11,143 3,270 698 240 347 111 10 5,807  CHN   Bas. Metal  2,275 2,536 728 334 283 111 70 1,213  TWN    Electronics  1,218 3,064 703 277 317 109 5 2,757  DEU   Machinery, n.e.s  7,508 3,756 823 364 352 106 37 4,278  MEX   Electrical  5,394 4,946 819 351 364 104 81 8,696  JPN   Machinery, n.e.s  4,985 3,308 753 323 327 103 26 1,996  MEX    Electronics  9,920 3,530 742 299 345 99 49 28,405  JPN   Metalproducts  1,211 3,242 675 286 293 96 27 1,320  MEX   Metalproducts  1,032 3,964 752 321 335 95 78 2,391  CAN   Metalproducts  1,436 3,000 597 269 244 84 140 2,025  CAN    Electronics  1,852 2,732 522 211 230 81 93 2,178  CAN   Machinery, n.e.s  4,364 3,078 591 261 251 79 125 3,626  CAN   Vehicle  15,660 3,546 536 202 267 67 193 20,901  DEU    Electronics  2,101 2,022 427 173 192 62 22 1,369  JPN   Electrical  2,574 2,195 407 169 178 60 15 1,594 Notes and source: see Table 5 
 “Factory Asia” --China in particular-- emerges prominently as supplier of intermediate products to the USA, together with the two other “NAFTA” countries, Canada and Mexico.  China appears three times in the Top-5 providers. The first European provider, Germany, classifies only for the 10th position.  On the other hand, imports of electronics from China –as for Mexican vehicles-- include a lot of US content returning home. This denotes close inter-industry supply chain arrangements that would be jeopardised by a bilateral trade conflict affecting these products. 5. Extraction and simulation results The core simulation focuses on the above mentioned four sectors, looking first at the impact of US’s restrictions on two Chinese industrial products: Basic Metals and Computers and electronics. Then, the impacts of China’s retaliations on USA Agriculture and Automobile sectors are assessed.  The individual sector analysis is completed by a wider multi-sectoral simulation. 
1)  Individual sector simulations 
a) China exports of basic metals to USA The loss of the US market in final and intermediate goods (not shown here) would represent a shortfall of about $7 070 million for the Chinese Manufacture of basic metals industry (WIOD industry code r15).  Most of the spill-over impacts, as measured by total requirements in the pre-crisis situation, are expected to fall on other Chinese industries.  When looking at the expected impacts on the 10 worst affected foreign suppliers (Table 7), Mining and Quarrying (industry code r4) ranks first, particularly in Australia, Russia and Brazil. Similarly, foreign Basic Metal manufacturers (r15) are losing big, especially in Japan, Australia and Korea. In Korea, the chemical sector (r11) and the electronic industry (r17) are also among the 
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most impacted industries, as well as Taiwanese electronic manufacturers. 
Table 7 Expected losses to third countries due to extraction of basic metals: top ten sectors (million dollars, 2014) 
ISO3 Sector a Total Requirements b Losses c 
AUS AUS_r4 1.7 123.4 
RUS RUS_r4 0.8 56.3 
JPN JPN_r15 0.7 50.7 
BRA BRA_r4 0.4 31.4 
KOR KOR_r11 0.4 25.2 
KOR KOR_r17 0.3 21.3 
TWN TWN_r17 0.3 21.2 
AUS AUS_r15 0.3 21.1 
KOR KOR_r15 0.3 20.1 
RUS RUS_r29 0.3 20.0 Notes: a/ see nomenclature in Annex; b/ pre-crisis total requirements from foreign suppliers for 100 million output; c/ expected production shortfall due to the fall in demand for intermediate inputs Source: Authors’ elaboration based on WIOT data 
 China tries in the next phase of our simulation to redeploy to other markets (domestic and export) the products previously sold to the USA. After this export deflection, the distribution of gains and losses results also, for non-US industries, from the exposure to increased Chinese competition on their markets. It should be noted that this redeployment will also affect their exports of value-added to the US market through the Global Value Chain effect. These value-added exports induced by US demand of basic metal cover not only the bilateral exports, but also the basic metal products exported to third countries’ industries and reprocessed to be eventually consumed to satisfy US sectoral demand. Because China will sell more of these intermediate inputs to third countries after redeployment, it will be able to indirectly recoup some of the losses even on the US market.  Table 8 shows the changes in the sectoral value-added resulting from theses simulations.  
Table 8 Basic metal: Evolution of the Sectoral Value Added, selected countries (Mn dollar and percentages) 
Country 1: Initial 
2: Short 
term 3: Long term 
4: Full 
Substitution Difference (4-1) 
AUS             6 249              6 253              6 252              6 128            -121  -1.9% 
BRA           18 521            18 562            18 554            18 494              -27  -0.1% 
CAN           27 231            27 478            27 428            27 360             128  0.5% 
CHN        291 395         289 712         289 711         290 689            -706  -0.2% 
DEU           32 061            32 100            32 093            31 944            -117  -0.4% 
FRA             7 378              7 384              7 383              7 366              -11  -0.2% 
GBR             7 806              7 819              7 817              7 709              -97  -1.2% 
IDN             7 220              7 223              7 223              7 191              -29  -0.4% 
IND           38 616            38 649            38 645            38 557              -59  -0.2% 
ITA           10 819            10 834            10 832            10 802              -17  -0.2% 
JPN           65 122            65 171            65 163            64 748            -375  -0.6% 
KOR           34 762            34 796            34 790            34 615            -147  -0.4% 
MEX           12 716            12 813            12 793            12 993             276  2.2% 
RUS           45 919            45 970            45 961            45 861              -58  -0.1% 
TUR             8 628              8 646              8 643              8 627                -1  0.0% 
TWN           10 097            10 106            10 103            10 157                60  0.6% 
USA           61 643            63 388            63 355            63 321          1 677  2.7% Note: Long term and Full Substitution correspond to no redeployment and 100% redeployment, respectively. The most expected outcome of 50% lies in-between these two extreme points. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on WIOD data 
 The US industry is expected to gain most, both in monetary or in relative terms, but we know that our method may overestimate these gains. Mexico – a country very dependent on the USA for its exports—gains almost in the same proportion relative to its pre-crisis situation, but only after Chinese redeployment: this indicates that the China-Mexico intra-industry trade is large enough to balance in part the Mexico-US dependency. China’s losses are large in monetary value, but almost nil when reported to its initial production. It is Australia who is the biggest losers in relative terms (-2%), due to increased competition of Chinese products on its non-US markets.  The impact on sectoral value-added is not limited to the sector of basic metal (r15) and 
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other industries gain or lose in the process. The rate of sectoral value-added and the World value of Final Demand remaining constant by construction, the net impact for each industry is the resultant of two effects: the first one is the change in markets shares and in technical coefficients, the second one is due to the changes in the geographical distribution of Final Demand. The end-result in terms of Gross Domestic Product is given in Figure 2.  
Figure 2 Basic metals: Total impact on GDP, as a difference from the initial situation (Mn dollar) 
 Source: Authors’ elaboration based on WIOD data 
 By construction, the substitution is a zero-sum game and total gains equal total losses. Gains are concentrated on the NAFTA members, with the USA as main beneficiary, and in Taiwan, but only marginally so (less than 100 million dollar). Besides China and the Rest of the World, the main losers are located in the Asia-Pacific region. Both results show the importance of the regional dimension in the Global Value Chains: be they positive or negative, the impacts are usually stronger on immediate neighbours.   Another interesting result relates to the redistribution of gains and losses when redeployment takes place. The extracted industry (here, Chinese manufacture of basic metal) would be able to significantly reduce its losses if it is able to redeploy all its lost sales, but it does so at the expense of other trade partners. Trade deflection means trade creation, on the one hand, because China increases its exports to third countries; it also means trade destruction because China reduces its imports from the same countries. This trade destruction proceeds from two effects. One is the lower level of activity of China’s basic metal industry; the second results from the substitution of imports due to the redeployment of some of the US exports towards the domestic market.   Mexico exhibits a very peculiar pattern. The answer to this riddle is to be found in the input-output tables: China is also a main market for Mexico’s exports of primary products (mining and quarrying) with sales to the Chinese industry of basic metals at above 550 million in 2014, quite a sizable amount for the Mexican industry. Therefore, Mexico’s gains can only fully concretise when the Chinese industry of basic metal picks-up again after its initial losses.  Even the protected industry (US’ basic metals) sees its initial gains reduced when it loses some of its export markets. These differences remain marginal when related to the total pre-crisis GDP: in the case of full redeployment, the biggest relative gain is found in Mexico (0.05% of GDP) and the largest loss in Australia (-0.04%). 
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Full redeployment is an extreme outcome that is mainly useful for illustrative purpose. In absence of additional information, the most probable outcome is the 50% redeployment option. In this case, China’s losses remain significant (about 4, 230 million dollars, see Figure 2). 
b) China exports of computer, electronic and optical products to USA The loss of the US market for final and intermediate goods would represent a large shortfall of $ 107 billion in sales of final and intermediate products for the Chinese Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products (industry code r17).  For foreign suppliers, most of the losses are concentrated in the same industrial branch and in the Asia-Pacific region, indicating the strength of intra-industry trade in a closely integrated regional value chain (Table 9). Chinese Taipei and Korea suppliers of electronics inputs are exposed to losses exceeding 5 million dollars, while the Japanese industry would face a shortfall larger than 2 million. Manufacturers of chemicals and chemical products (industry code r11) in these countries are also at risk. The US industry benefitting from the protectionist measures at home would face also a drop close to 600 thousand dollars in its sales of electronics inputs to China. Australia is affected as upstream supplier of mineral inputs (r4) while the Korean downstream sector of retail trade (r30) will also be indirectly affected by the embargo.  
Table 9 Expected losses to third countries due to extraction of China’s electronic and optical products: top ten foreign 
suppliers (million dollars, 2014) 
Country Sector a 
Total 
Requirement 
Index b Losses c 
TWN TWN_r17 5.5         5 858  
KOR KOR_r17 4.7         5 033  
JPN JPN_r17 2.2         2 327  
KOR KOR_r11 0.8            904  
TWN TWN_r11 0.6            624  
JPN JPN_r15 0.6            596  
USA USA_r17 0.5            575  
JPN JPN_r11 0.5            491  
AUS AUS_r4 0.5            490  
KOR KOR_r30 0.4            402  Notes and sources: see Table 8 
 The global effects after considering substitution and redeployment effects, are presented in Table 10.  
Table 10 Electronics: Evolution of the Sectoral Value Added, selected countries (Mn dollar and percentages) 
Country 1: Initial  2: Short term 3: Long term 
4: Full 
Substitution   Difference (4-1) 
AUS             4 105              4 155              4 150              3 564             -541  -13.2% 
BRA           12 166            12 195            12 192            11 782             -384  -3.2% 
CAN             9 609            10 893            10 732            10 109              500  5.2% 
CHN        280 295         249 557         249 484         278 786         -1 509  -0.5% 
DEU           47 589            48 564            48 451            43 785         -3 804  -8.0% 
FRA           14 281            14 550            14 512            12 955         -1 326  -9.3% 
GBR           19 539            19 999            19 951            18 260         -1 279  -6.5% 
IDN             6 055              6 244              6 235              5 566             -489  -8.1% 
IND             7 140              7 187              7 182              6 702             -438  -6.1% 
ITA           10 993            11 105            11 091            10 350             -643  -5.9% 
JPN           96 431            98 032            97 720            88 395         -8 035  -8.3% 
KOR           92 780            93 491            93 236            83 495         -9 284  -10.0% 
MEX           11 331            14 367            14 204            14 277           2 946  26.0% 
RUS           14 053            14 063            14 061            13 422             -631  -4.5% 
TUR             2 883              2 888              2 888              2 540             -343  -11.9% 
TWN           81 028            80 350            80 102            71 867         -9 161  -11.3% 
USA        270 128         332 400         328 582         318 569         48 442  17.9% Notes and sources: see Table 8 
 Chinese electronic industry is able to compensate most of its losses through redeployment to other markets for both final and intermediate products. The US industry registers an increase in 
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its value-added close to 50 billion dollars, representing a 18% increase on the pre-crisis situation. These gains pale in comparison to the relative improvement of 26% that would register Mexico, one of the main competitors of China in the processing of exports to the US market. In the NAFTA region, Canada’s gains are much more modest (5%). All other G20 countries as well as Chinese Taipei register losses, due to the increased competition of Chinese products on their domestic and export markets after full redeployment. Australia, Turkey, Chinese Taipei and Korea are the most affected, with losses ranging from 13% to 10% of their pre-crisis sectoral value added.  The above table tells only part of the story, because other industries may gain or lose in relation to their exposure to changes in the activity of the electronics industry. The distribution of gains and loses is, again, conditional on the capacity for China to redeploy part or totality of its losses suffered on the US market. The mean value corresponding to a 50% redeployment, indicates a potential loss of USD 41.9 billion for China’s GDP.  In case of full redeployment, the main regional trade partners of China are expected to suffer most from the changes in their market shares (Figure 3). Germany, one of the main non-regional trade partners of China, would also suffer from the crisis. On the positive side of the graph, only the three NAFTA countries would register increases in their GDP; but the gains in Canada and Mexico remain modest. Even the large US gains would be dented in the event of China’s full export redeployment, depriving it from part of its foreign markets with an overall GDP impact of about -12.5 billion compared to zero redeployment. 
Figure 3 Electronics: Total impact on GDP, as a difference from the initial situation (Mn dollar) 
 Source: Authors’ elaboration based on WIOD data 
 
c) US agriculture exports to China We turn now to the consequences of China excluding the US agricultural sector (sector code r1) from its market. Comparing the total requirement index of Table 11 with similar indicators in the previous cases, it appears that the US agricultural sector is clearly an upstream sector loosely integrated with foreign suppliers. On the other hand, China is an important export market with USD 11 billion (7% of US sectoral exports) according to the 2014 WIOD tables.  Canada is particularly exposed to a slump in this US sector, especially through its primary sectors of mining (r4) and agriculture (r1). Interestingly, the Chinese chemical industry (r11) would be the second most adversely impacted, with losses greater than 5 billion. Chinese industry of electronics (r17) and machinery equipment (r19) would also be exposed, either through their direct exports to the US market or by the way of their sales to other countries supplying the US 
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agricultural sector with inputs. 
Table 11 Expected losses to third countries due to extraction of US agricultural products: top ten foreign suppliers 
(million dollars, 2014) 
ISO3 Sector a 
Total 
Requirement 
Index b Losses c 
CAN CAN_r4 0.9       10 430  
CHN CHN_r11 0.5         5 121  
CAN CAN_r1 0.4         4 519  
MEX MEX_r4 0.3         3 252  
CAN CAN_r10 0.3         2 977  
JPN JPN_r11 0.3         2 948  
DEU DEU_r11 0.2         2 380  
CHN CHN_r17 0.2         2 197  
CAN CAN_r11 0.2         2 188  
CHN CHN_r19 0.2         2 173  Notes and sources: see Table 8 
 Considering the size of the US agricultural sector, redeploying its Chinese exports to other markets will also have large effects on third countries. Table 12 presents the simulation results on the agricultural value-added on our selection of countries. The US agricultural sector is barely affected by the loss of the Chinese market, but displace in its redeployment Canadian and Mexican outputs, resulting in drops of their sectoral value-added of 4% and 9%, respectively. Brazil is also on the losing side, but only marginally (-1%). Chinese gains are also marginal (1%), all other sectors remain largely unaffected. If the US agricultural sector itself was relatively unaffected by the embargo after redeployment, the lower activity observed for the Canadian and Mexican agricultural sector affects other US industries that are providers of inputs to these countries.   
Table 12 Agriculture: Evolution of the Sectoral Value Added, selected countries (Mn dollar and percentages) 
Country 1: Initial  2: Short term 3: Long term 4: Full Substitution   Difference (4-1) 
AUS           31 253            31 281            31 272            31 221               -32  -0.1% 
BRA        107 124         107 294         107 247         106 046         -1 078  -1.0% 
CAN           20 878            20 876            20 838            18 982         -1 897  -9.1% 
CHN        841 725         851 314         849 590         849 344           7 619  0.9% 
DEU           23 093            23 093            23 091            23 007               -86  -0.4% 
FRA           41 051            41 053            41 048            40 988               -64  -0.2% 
GBR           18 304            18 304            18 303            18 276               -28  -0.2% 
IDN           92 080            92 081            92 079            91 703             -377  -0.4% 
IND        267 242         267 260         267 239         266 955             -288  -0.1% 
ITA           40 206            40 206            40 202            40 183               -23  -0.1% 
JPN           47 904            47 905            47 901            47 813               -91  -0.2% 
KOR           26 010            26 010            26 007            25 969               -41  -0.2% 
MEX           38 249            38 241            38 027            36 861         -1 388  -3.6% 
RUS           54 013            54 015            54 013            53 933               -80  -0.1% 
TUR           58 418            58 416            58 409            58 099             -320  -0.5% 
TWN             8 432              8 432              8 431              8 381               -51  -0.6% 
USA        178 344         172 835         173 076         178 289               -55  0.0% Notes and sources: see Table 8 
 The overall impact on the whole US economy is measured through its GDP (In absence of redeployment, the impact on the USA is large (a loss of about 9,800 million) and it remains significant (minus 730 million) in case of full redeployment: even if the agricultural sector was able to recoup its losses, US suppliers will lose some of the sales to their foreign customers, in particular to other NAFTA partners and to Brazil, which suffer most from this redeployment.  On the winning side, there is only one country, China, which captures all the benefits with gains close to ten billion (remember that, by construction, this is a zero-sum game), but we know that our method overestimates these gains. If we compare with the previous case on electronics (Figure 3), US’ export redeployment does not affect much China’s gains, a sign that China does not compete against 
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the USA on this line of products. 
Figure 4). In absence of redeployment, the impact on the USA is large (a loss of about 9,800 million) and it remains significant (minus 730 million) in case of full redeployment: even if the agricultural sector was able to recoup its losses, US suppliers will lose some of the sales to their foreign customers, in particular to other NAFTA partners and to Brazil, which suffer most from this redeployment.  On the winning side, there is only one country, China, which captures all the benefits with gains close to ten billion (remember that, by construction, this is a zero-sum game), but we know that our method overestimates these gains. If we compare with the previous case on electronics (Figure 3), US’ export redeployment does not affect much China’s gains, a sign that China does not compete against the USA on this line of products. 
Figure 4 Agriculture: Total impact on GDP, as a difference from the initial situation (Mn dollar) 
 Source: Authors’ elaboration based on WIOD data 
 
d) US exports of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers to China With less than 9 billion dollars, the Chinese market represents only 1.5% of the US output of motor vehicles according to WIOD’s 2014 tables (sector code r_20). The Mexican automobile industry would be on the first line to suffer from a recession in this US industry, with losses of USD 270 million. Interestingly, China itself would feel the pain, as it is a large supplier of value-added to the US industry. It appears five time in the list of the ten most affected industry by the size of the total requirements in the initial pre-crisis situation (see Table 13).  
Table 13 Expected losses to third countries due to extraction of US automotive products: top ten foreign suppliers 
(million dollars, 2014) 
ISO3 Sector a 
Total  
Requirement 
Index b Losses c 
MEX MEX_r20 3.0            270  
JPN JPN_r20 2.5            217  
CHN CHN_r20 2.1            182  
CHN CHN_r17 1.7            150  
DEU DEU_r20 1.4            127  
CHN CHN_r15 1.2            108  
CAN CAN_r20 1.2            106  
KOR KOR_r20 1.0              85  
CHN CHN_r11 0.9             77  
CHN CHN_r19 0.9              76  Notes and sources: see Table 8 
 The five most exposed Mexican industries would suffer potential losses of 416 million, compared to 593 million in the case of China. This indicates that China, even if it is not a main 
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exporter of final products to the US like Japan or Germany automobile industries, is an important provider of intermediate inputs.  All in all, the US automotive industry would not suffer much if it is able to compensate its losses by redeploying its exports to third markets (Table 14).  Canada (-3%) and Mexico (-2%) would be most affected in both monetary and relative terms. Germany and Japan would also suffer high monetary losses, but they would be relatively marginal compared to their overall output. The Chinese industry could expect gains in value-added bordering 2.5 billion (1% above the pre-crisis situation). 
Table 14 Automotive sector: Evolution of the Sectoral Value Added, selected countries (Mn dollar and percentages) 
Countries 1: Initial  2: Short term 3: Long term 4: Full Substitution   Difference (4-1) 
AUS             3 516              3 516              3 511              3 510                 -6  -0.2% 
BRA           36 746            36 744            36 735            36 732               -14  0.0% 
CAN           16 322            16 298            15 896            15 859             -463  -2.8% 
CHN        229 990         232 439         232 488         232 457           2 467  1.1% 
DEU        147 491         147 607         147 013         146 973             -517  -0.4% 
FRA           15 118            15 120            15 106            15 103               -14  -0.1% 
GBR           20 926            20 950            20 885            20 882               -44  -0.2% 
IDN           16 767            16 766            16 759            16 757               -10  -0.1% 
IND           23 822            23 820            23 815            23 812               -10  0.0% 
ITA           14 900            14 902            14 860            14 856               -44  -0.3% 
JPN           93 109            93 130            92 415            92 360             -749  -0.8% 
KOR           37 997            38 000            37 751            37 731             -266  -0.7% 
MEX           40 112            40 039            39 559            39 479             -633  -1.6% 
RUS           16 616            16 616            16 610            16 609                 -7  0.0% 
TUR             6 023              6 022              6 017              6 015                 -7  -0.1% 
TWN             4 752              4 744              4 743              4 735               -17  -0.4% 
USA        145 059         142 444         144 630         144 875             -184  -0.1% Notes and sources: see Table 8 
 As before, the possibility of redeploying the losses to other markets changes dramatically the simulation results. If full redeployment of US exports takes place after the Chinese embargo on US automotive products, Japan, Mexico, Germany and Canada are expected to suffer more in terms of total GDP than the USA itself (Figure 5). Korean GDP is also expected to drop by about 550 million.  
Figure 5 Automotive sector:  Total impact on GDP, as a difference from the initial situation (Mn dollar) 
 Source: Authors’ elaboration based on WIOD data 
2) Third countries exposure to a wider China-USA trade conflict To conclude this empirical exploration of the spillover effects on third countries, we consider the impacts caused on their economy if the bilateral trade conflict extends to other key export sectors. To this aim, we simulate “in silico” a series of bilateral shocks, affecting 12 good producing sectors, emanating alternatively from China and from the USA, giving a total of 24 simulations. For each 
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sector, we consider only the impact on GDP of the two extreme scenarios (without and with full redeployment) of extraction-substitution. The first scenario gives the gains or losses accruing to third countries from the exclusion of Chinese products on the US market or, symmetrically, the exclusion of US products from China. The second one indicates the vulnerability of these third countries to China and USA being successful in fully redeploying the excluded exports to other markets. The simulation generates a total of 720 observations: 24 sectoral shocks on 15 G20 countries (excluding China and the USA) and two datapoints per simulation. The statistical treatment is conducted using principal component analysis, a multi-dimensional exploratory tool particularly well suited in this context where many results are strongly correlated.  Figure 6 shows the results obtained for the first two components, after a varimax rotation. These two components represent about 75 percent of the total information (or variance) provided by the 720 datapoints. As usual with this type of exploratory analysis, the interpretation of the components requires a separate analysis of the correlations of the variables (the sectoral shocks) and the observations (the 15 countries).  
Figure 6  Principal Component Analysis of the GDP responses to bilateral China-USA shocks 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on WIOD data 
 The first component, on the horizontal axis, explains 45% of the total variance. Its interpretation is relatively straightforward: on the left-hand side of the diagram, we find countries that register, in average of the sectors, a positive gain when China exports are targeted by the USA while the right side of the graph corresponds to countries that tend to gain when US exports are targeted by China. Interpreting the vertical axis (29% of the total variance) is more complex: On the top side of the graph, we find countries that (i) lose market share when China is able to redeploy 100% of its extracted exports or (ii) gain when the US exports are blocked by China and the USA is not able to redeploy its lost exports.  The combination of these two components identifies three groups of countries, with Australia being in a separate category. Mexico and Canada make a first group of countries that gain when China is excluded from the US market and are not much affected by China’s increased competition on other markets. This situation reflects their strong export-orientation to the US market. The second group (Chinese Taipei and Korea) gains also when China is excluded from the 
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US market, but are very vulnerable to a redeployment of Chinese exports to other markets.  The third group, more numerous, is arranged along the first diagonal of the graph. We find here countries like Germany and Japan that share some of the Taipei and Korea characteristic, and other, at the lower end of the diagonal, that are suppliers of primary goods to China (Brazil, Russia) and are not much affected by Chinese competition on their other export markets. Australia is relatively close to this situation, but with some specificities that puts it in a special case. In particular, Australia is more vulnerable to the redeployment of Chinese exports in some sectors such as basic metal. 6. Post-COVID19 Implications for the Multilateral Trade System The above-mentioned results are probably conservative. In particular, the simulations do not take into account the probable drop in demand caused by the reduced activity in several industrial sectors. Moreover, uncertainty is often accompanied by trade destruction. And indeed, the 2018-2019 trade conflict between China and the USA brought severe impacts on global economy. WTO (2019) had to lower its estimate of world trade growth in 2018 from 4.7% in 2017. The revised figure was a low 2.9% for 2018, and a flat 0.2% in 2019, weighed down by trade tensions and slowing economic growth (WTO, 2020).  This shortfall was mostly explained by the high degree of uncertainty associated with World trade, including new tariffs and retaliatory measures. They weighted on the overall business climate, resulting in weaker global economic growth. The COVID-19 pandemics affected both trade volumes (-5.3%) and international prices (-8.0%).  As a result of the crisis, merchandise trade in nominal dollar terms fell in 2020 by about 8%.  Multilateral trade governance was also affected. Despite the “phase one” trade deal of January 2020 between China and the USA, economic and geopolitical bilateral tensions have continued to escalate. The COVID-19 crisis put in evidence the risks of depending on unreliable sources of key inputs, and in September 2020, the US administration declared that it “will end our reliance on China” through “decoupling” or “massive tariffs”. In 2015, China had already declared that the objective of its “Made in China 2025” was to gain domestic autonomy and world leadership in a series of key value chains. However, it is not just China and the US that are pulling away. In February 2019, the EU announced that steel imports will be subject to quotas to counter the concerns of trade deflection and fears that Europe could be flooded with steel that is no longer being imported into the United States. Then, the EU adopted a series of measure to control foreign direct investment, especially from State-sponsored firms and investment funds.  The trend accelerated due to the COVID-19 crisis and concerns for securing critical inputs through foreign suppliers, highlighting the risks of supply chain disruption. By restricting shipments of merchandises between countries, the crisis impacted many industries worldwide and created shortages of several critical goods, in particular medicines and health-related equipment.  The EU published in 2020 a paper on industrial strategy, which is seen as a drive towards reducing the reliance on the outside world. Ms von der Leyen, EU Commission president, has called for Europe to have "mastery and ownership of key technology" (G. Rachman, Financial Times 10/05/2020). 2020 was also the year when the final phase of Brexit was implemented, increasing GVC trade costs within Europe.  In the process, the UK authorities published in 2021 a plan for a “Global Britain”, to benefit from the increased degree of economic-diplomacy freedom, to respond more effectively to the changing world order and to prepare for a new age of trade competition. It is 
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perceived that the post-Brexit strategy aims at rebalancing trade relationships with EU and with North America, and looks at diversifying GVC dependencies away from China.  The COVID-19 crisis has also further damaged the idea that the globalization of production was a win-win situation. Many governments in developed and emerging countries have been anxious about issues of food and medical supply security, and launched initiatives to promote national production, the reshoring of manufacturing at home or its near-shoring closer to home. This nervousness is also observable in the business community, especially the managers of large global supply chains because of ‘supply-chain contagion’.  As Baldwin and Tomiura (2020) conclude, the reaction of governments and firms to repatriate production and increase protectionism is a danger of permanent damage to the trade system. All these actions may have far-reaching implications on the structure of global value chains and on global trade governance. In the Post COVID era, the cost/benefit balance of international trade is being increasingly assessed from the perspective of national security and geopolitical strategy. This is a huge departure from the pre-COVID19 situation where the debates on the costs and benefits of globalization were mainly set in terms of welfare, economic growth and job creation or destruction.  In the process, the role of the World Trade Organization as the institution embodying multilateral trade governance and providing a dispute settlement mechanism has been put in jeopardy. For Hoekman (2020), the WTO has not played a significant role in defusing trade conflicts between the US and other trading partners.   In addition to supply chain disruptions, the present paper highlights the risk of trade deflection attached to trade conflicts. Deflection, as mentioned by Evenett and Fritz (2018), increases the chance of “multilateralising” the bilateral conflict. The redeployment of exports when a large market is blockaded inflicts potentially large losses to third countries and would probably induce them to take their own protectionist measures to shield their industries from the increased trade competition.  Such decoupling from the competitive collaboration between USA and China that characterised the late 1990s and early 2000s, leading to a disruption and re-ordering of global value chains, is one of the three scenarios mentioned by Choi (2020). As a result, GVC trade may split into two spheres competing for influence, one being US/EU-centred and the other China-centred. The end-result would prove disastrous for the multilateral trade governance, mimicking the spiralling protectionism that followed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, which raised U.S. tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods to record levels and was reciprocated by many countries, deepening the global recession. 7. Conclusions The analysis of the spill-over effects of a bilateral trade war between China and the USA shows that a large share of the negative impact is felt by third countries. They are affected first as suppliers of inputs to the industries that are targeted by the trade conflict. They also suffer, and to a larger extent, from the increased competition that may prevail when the targeted industry tries redeploying part or totality of its losses to other markets in other countries. The mapping of the gains and losses arising from the bilateral China-USA conflict shows that the spill-over effects are usually higher in neighbouring countries, and confirms that global value chains are principally regional ones. But it would be wrong to assume that geography alone explains the results: for some suppliers, the gains that could be expected on their regional market 
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are balanced by the indirect losses due to the lower activity suffered by the targeted industry.  The monetary value of the expected gains and losses for foreign suppliers is significant in many cases. In our simulation, the largest impacts were found when the USA apply protectionist measures against China. The spill-over effects of an embargo on US products by China do not generate similarly large economic effects. Hu et al. (2021) reach similar conclusions. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the simulation measures quantities on aggregate sectors. At the micro level, US firms dependent upon China for key inputs or for their export market may have to exit the market, with significant qualitative implications. First, because exporting firms are usually more innovative than domestic-oriented ones; second because international trade, besides the monetary dimension, has qualitative impacts on learning and sharing technologies and know-how that cannot be measured in our simulation but is probably larger than a simple count of dollars. The current paper examined trade conflicts that are limited to shocks affecting just one single product at a time. Even if the monetary value of the losses and gains for third countries are important, they remain small in proportion of their total trade. But a more widespread conflict affecting a wider range of merchandises and industries would have far reaching implications, including on other countries.  The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated a trend towards a return of economic protectionism, which was already perceptible since the 2008-2009 global crisis. The deglobalization trend has been exacerbated by rising geo-political tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the China-USA trade conflict that erupted in 2018. The Brexit saga reinforces this deglobalization movement. In only five years, from 2015 to 2020, the three main trading actors (China, USA and Europe) have shifted towards industrial nationalism in a Tit-for-Tat escalation.  The risk here is to see other affected countries to follow the same strategy, taking unilateral measures to protect their industries, either by increasing tariffs or by providing exposed industries with subsidies to enhance their cost competitiveness in the face of increased international competition.   As suggested in our paper, the damage on World Trade governance should not be minimized. Indeed, it is important to make the difference between a pure trade dispute, as in our example, and a wider geo-political confrontation between two super-powers. In this case, third countries may not be able to remain neutral by-standers and would have to choose their camp. Hue et al. (2021) warn that trade decoupling of the world’s two leading economies is likely to trigger worldwide a “tsunami” in transnational investment, global financial markets, science and technology fields. A similar situation occurred in 18th and 19th century Europe, where trade was mainly an instrument at the service of geo-political objectives, a situation that returned in the 1920s and 1930s, with dire implications. The re-shoring and near-shoring of international supply chains within realigned regional trading blocs may reduce systemic geo-political risks and increase GVC resilience. But this is a second-best solution compared to the first-best option of preserving and modernising global trade governance under multilateral rules. A fair and free trading environment is essential for global development. The main challenge for the future of globalisation is institutional and political in nature. Trade conflicts must be solved and disputes settled at WTO. But the WTO is also in crisis, it needs to find a new modus operandi, in particular to adapt to the new trade environment and defuse trade tensions in the form of better trade and industrial policy monitoring.  Thanks for reading… 
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Label Code Label Code 
Crop and animal production, hunting and related service 
activities 
r1 
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
r28 
Forestry and logging r2 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles r29 
Fishing and aquaculture r3 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles r30 
Mining and quarrying r4 Land transport and transport via pipelines r31 
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 
products 
r5 Water transport r32 
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather 
products 
r6 Air transport r33 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 
r7 Warehousing and support activities for transportation r34 
Manufacture of paper and paper products r8 Postal and courier activities r35 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media r9 Accommodation and food service activities r36 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  r10 Publishing activities r37 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  r11 
Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound 
recording and music publishing activities; programming and 
broadcasting activities 
r38 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations 
r12 Telecommunications r39 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products r13 
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities; 
information service activities 
r40 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products r14 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding r41 
Manufacture of basic metals r15 
Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory 
social security 
r42 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment 
r16 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities r43 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products r17 Real estate activities r44 
Manufacture of electrical equipment r18 
Legal and accounting activities; activities of head offices; 
management consultancy activities 
r45 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. r19 
Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and 
analysis 
r46 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers r20 Scientific research and development r47 
Manufacture of other transport equipment r21 Advertising and market research r48 
Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing r22 
Other professional, scientific and technical activities; veterinary 
activities 
r49 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment r23 Administrative and support service activities r50 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply r24 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security r51 
Water collection, treatment and supply r25 Education r52 
Sewerage; waste collection, treatment and disposal 
activities; materials recovery; remediation activities and 
other waste management services  
r26 Human health and social work activities r53 
Construction r27 Other service activities r54 
  
Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and 
services-producing activities of households for own use 
r55 
  Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies r56 
 
